Bibliographic record
Abstract
Canadian Muslims are increasingly active and prominent in political and circles. Still, little is known about the groups that claim to represent them; surprisingly few academic studies have been conducted about the community's political organization or activities. This study seeks to begin to fill this gap by examining the foreign policy interests of two leading Canadian Muslim groups-the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and the Council American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN)-between 2000 and 2005.1These two organizations have been chosen for in-depth study because of their prominence: they have access to federal government ministers, politicians, and policymakers, and are prolific contributors to the national media. Debates about the groups' representativeness of what are very diverse Canadian Muslim communities continue-and will not be addressed here. As a result, this study does not claim that the interests of these organizations are indicative of those of Canadian Muslims in general (nor can we suggest that there are parallels with Muslim organizations in other western countries without further study).2 Nevertheless, because CIC and CAIR-CAN are taken by those in positions of power to be the spokespeople of Canadian Muslims, it is important to understand their political views.FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTSForeign policy is only one of several interests for CIC and CAIR-CAN. Both the president of CIC, Mohamed Elmasry, and the former chair of CAIR-CAN, Sheema Khan, suggested instead that their organizations were most concerned with Muslim integration within Canada. Elmasry stated the organization's objective as follows: The main project which drives CICeven before 9/11-is what we call smart integration...which is a happy medium between assimilation and isolation.3 CIC's efforts to influence Canadian foreign policy are considered to be one aspect of this overarching theme, as Elmasry argued:So when it comes to influencing foreign policy, it's part of the agenda of smart integration because foreign policy affects domestic policy and also Muslims cannot divorce themselves from the association of the world at large, especially [because] the Muslim world right now is victimized because of oil and because of [its] strategic position and because of the large market of 1.2 billion people.Similarly, CAIR-CAN's Khan suggested that advocacy foreign policy issues was on our low priority list, coming after media engagement, human rights and, more importantly...educating the Muslim community in Canada about Canadian institutions and how to become engaged-so what you would call integration.4 Khan explained:But [with] regards to getting involved in foreign affairs per se, we decided not to go there for a variety of reasons: one, lack of resources. And...really, we want to focus Muslims integrating here. I mean the other thing is...for so many years Muslim communities have been preoccupied with the situation quote back home...and that's fine but...we feel it's important to [be]...an organization that bridges...the priorities of, if you like, immigrant Muslim communities with the institutions here.Analysis of the main documents produced by each group in the period 2000-05-primarily press releases and emails to subscribers and members-confirmed that foreign policy was a lesser focus than domestic issues.5 Interestingly, both organizations had nearly equal proportions of foreign affairs'5 to total documents, at just less than a quarter.7 Moreover, in both cases, the proportion of documents that focused foreign affairs fluctuated dramatically depending the year-ranging between 17 and 47 percent for CIC and between five and 39 percent for CAIR-CAN.However, the degree of foreign interest within the two organizations' respective documents did not match up year to year and often fluctuated in different directions. For example, in 2002, when CAIR-CAN issued its highest proportion of international to total documents, CIC had its smallest ratio of the six years. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.015 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".