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Record W2891323818 · doi:10.3386/w18843

Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market

2013· preprint· en· W2891323818 on OpenAlexaff
Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, James Witkin

Bibliographic record

VenueNational Bureau of Economic Research · 2013
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHousing Market and Economics
Canadian institutionsBooth University College
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMisrepresentationBusinessIntermediaryFinancial intermediaryIntermediationInterest rateActuarial scienceAsset qualityUnderwritingMonetary economicsFinancial systemFinanceEconomicsIncentive

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We contend that buyers received false information about the true quality of assets in contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages in the $2 trillion non-agency market.We construct two measures of misrepresentation of asset quality -misreported occupancy status of borrower and misreported second liens -by comparing the characteristics of mortgages disclosed to the investors at the time of sale with actual characteristics of these loans at that time that are available in a dataset matched by a credit bureau.About one out of every ten loans has one of these misrepresentations.These misrepresentations are not likely to be an artifact of matching error between datasets that contain actual characteristics and those that are reported to investors.At least part of this misrepresentation likely occurs within the boundaries of the financial industry (i.e., not by borrowers).The propensity of intermediaries to sell misrepresented loans increased as the housing market boomed.These misrepresentations are costly for investors, as ex post delinquencies of such loans are more than 60% higher when compared with otherwise similar loans.Lenders seem to be partly aware of this risk, charging a higher interest rate on misrepresented loans relative to otherwise similar loans, but the interest rate markup on misrepresented loans does not fully reflect their higher default risk.Using measures of pricing used in the literature, we find no evidence that these misrepresentations were priced in the securities at their issuance.A significant degree of misrepresentation exists across all reputable intermediaries involved in sale of mortgages.The propensity to misrepresent seems to be largely unrelated to measures of incentives for top management, to quality of risk management inside these firms or to regulatory environment in a region.Misrepresentations on just two relatively easy-toquantify dimensions of asset quality could result in forced repurchases of mortgages by intermediaries up to $160 billion.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.011
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.100
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.011
Threshold uncertainty score0.059

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0110.100
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0030.004
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0040.005
Open science0.0020.004
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0100.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.385
GPT teacher head0.480
Teacher spread0.095 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2013
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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