Public Policy for Regulating the Interaction between Labor Market Supply and Higher Education Demand - Israel as a Case Study
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The global labor market in general and the Israeli market in particular have been experiencing considerable changes in recent decades, affecting the supply of jobs in various occupations. There seems to be an association between changes in the supply of jobs in the labor market and shifts in the demand for higher education. Examination of two case studies in the Israeli economy shows a bidirectional interaction between the labor market and the system of higher education. In one case, the growing supply of jobs in the field of computers and engineering was found to result in an increasing demand for academic education in this discipline. In the second case, the growing demand for academic education in law resulted in a flooded labor market in this industry with bad effects for the industry. The public policy formed in Israel to regulate the labor market and the system of higher education is aimed at the short term and makes do with examining actual circumstances retrospectively and attempting to improve them by directing students to various disciplines in order to meet the needs of the labor market or correct its failures. It does not, however, examine future trends and try to identify prospective needs and faults that can be predicted in the present.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.005 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".