Auction-Based Time Scheduling for Backscatter-Aided RF-Powered Cognitive Radio Networks
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper investigates the time scheduling for a backscatter-aided radio-frequency-powered cognitive radio network, where multiple secondary transmitters transmit data to the same secondary gateway in the backscatter mode and the harvest-then-transmit mode. With many secondary transmitters connected to the network, the total transmission demand of the secondary transmitters may frequently exceed the transmission capacity of the secondary network. As such, the secondary gateway is more likely to assign the time resource, i.e., the backscattering time in the backscatter mode and the transmission time in the harvest-then-transmit mode, to the secondary transmitters with higher transmission valuations. Therefore, according to a variety of demand requirements from secondary transmitters, we design two auction-based time scheduling mechanisms for the time resource assignment. In the auctions, the secondary gateway acts as the seller as well as the auctioneer, and the secondary transmitters act as the buyers to bid for the time resource. We design the winner determination, the time scheduling, and the pricing schemes for both the proposed auction-based mechanisms. Furthermore, the economic properties, such as individual rationality and truthfulness, and the computational efficiency of our proposed mechanisms are analytically evaluated. The simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanisms.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it