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Record W2915352994 · doi:10.33137/js.v2i0.29645

The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic

2018· article· en· W2915352994 on OpenAlexaffvenue
Maxim Mirkin

Bibliographic record

VenueScientonomy Journal for the Science of Science · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPhilosophy and History of Science
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEpistemologyNormativeSociology of scientific knowledgeTechnological changeTacit knowledgeNatural (archaeology)Computer scienceSociologyPhilosophyArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, I argue that there is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly accept theories, technological communities merely use them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal sciences, and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic. Suggested Modifications [Sciento-2018-0011]: Accept the three-fold distinction between explicit, explicable-implicit, and inexplicable with the following definitions: Explicit ≡ propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent. Explicable-Implicit ≡ propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent. Inexplicable ≡ non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions. Also accept the following definition of implicit: Implicit ≡ not explicit. [Sciento-2018-0012]: Accept that propositional technological knowledge – i.e. technological questions, theories, and methods – can be part of a mosaic. Also accept the following questions as legitimate topics of scientonomic inquiry: History of Technological Mosaics: What technological theories were accepted and what technological methods were employed by different epistemic agents at different time periods? The Status of Inexplicable Knowledge: Is there such a thing as inexplicable knowledge? Typology of Technological Knowledge: What types of technological knowledge are there?

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.015
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.024
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesScience and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.991
Threshold uncertainty score0.081

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0150.024
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0040.004
Science and technology studies0.0090.073
Scholarly communication0.0200.033
Open science0.0020.010
Research integrity0.0050.008
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0050.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.085
GPT teacher head0.310
Teacher spread0.225 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2018
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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