Blockchain-Based Public Integrity Verification for Cloud Storage against Procrastinating Auditors
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The deployment of cloud storage services has significant benefits in managing data for users. However, it also causes many security concerns, and one of them is data integrity. Public verification techniques can enable a user to employ a third-party auditor to verify the data integrity on behalf of her/him, whereas existing public verification schemes are vulnerable to <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">procrastinating auditors</i> who may not perform verifications on time. Furthermore, most of public verification schemes are constructed on the public key infrastructure (PKI), and thereby suffer from certificate management problem. In this paper, we propose a <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">c</u> ertificateless <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">p</u> ublic <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">v</u> erification scheme against <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">p</u> rocrastinating <underline xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">a</u> uditors (CPVPA) by using <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">blockchain technology</i> . The key idea is to require auditors to record each verification result into a transaction on a blockchain. Because transactions on the blockchain are time-sensitive, the verification can be time-stamped after the transaction is recorded into the blockchain, which enables users to check whether auditors perform the verifications at the prescribed time. Moreover, CPVPA is built on certificateless cryptography, and is free from the certificate management problem. We present rigorous security proofs to demonstrate the security of CPVPA, and conduct a comprehensive performance evaluation to show that CPVPA is efficient.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it