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Record W2949186720 · doi:10.65109/bjlr8765

Sharing a reward based on peer evaluations

2010· preprint· en· W2949186720 on OpenAlexaff
Arthur Carvalho, Kate Larson

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Waterloo
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCollusionMechanism (biology)IncentiveComputer scienceIncentive compatibilityMicroeconomicsGroup (periodic table)Value (mathematics)EconomicsMachine learning

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of the group, where highly regarded agents receive a greater share compared to agents that are not well regarded. We introduce two mechanisms for determining agents' shares: the peer-evaluation mechanism, where each agent gives a direct evaluation for every other member of the group, and the peer-prediction mechanism, where each agent is asked to report how they believe group members will evaluate a particular agent. The sharing is based on the provided information. While both mechanisms are individually rational, the first mechanism is strategy-proof and budget-balanced, but it can be collusion-prone. Further, the second mechanism is collusion-resistant and incentive-compatible.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.863
Threshold uncertainty score0.995

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0020.001
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0180.006

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.278
GPT teacher head0.503
Teacher spread0.226 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2010
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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