Modelos de formulación de cuentas anuales y obligación de auditoría
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Human genomic information can yield more effective healthcare by guiding medical decisions. Therefore, genomics research is gaining popularity as it can identify potential correlations between a disease and a certain gene, which improves the safety and efficacy of drug treatment and can also develop more effective prevention strategies [1]. To reduce the sampling error and to increase the statistical accuracy of this type of research projects, data from different sources need to be brought together since a single organization does not necessarily possess required amount of data. In this case, data sharing among multiple organizations must satisfy strict policies (for instance, HIPAA and PIPEDA) that have been enforced to regulate privacy-sensitive data sharing. Storage and computation on the shared data can be outsourced to a third party cloud service provider, equipped with enormous storage and computation resources. However, outsourcing data to a third party is associated with a potential risk of privacy violation of the participants, whose genomic sequence or clinical profile is used in these studies. In this article, we propose a method for secure sharing and computation on genomic data in a semi-honest cloud server. In particular, there are two main contributions. Firstly, the proposed method can handle biomedical data containing both genotype and phenotype. Secondly, our proposed index tree scheme reduces the computational overhead significantly for executing secure count query operation. In our proposed method, the confidentiality of shared data is ensured through encryption, while making the entire computation process efficient and scalable for cutting-edge biomedical applications. We evaluated our proposed method in terms of efficiency on a database of Single-Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP) sequences, and experimental results demonstrate that the execution time for a query of 50 SNPs in a database of 50,000 records is approximately 5 s, where each record contains 500 SNPs. And, it requires 69.7 s to execute the query on the same database that also includes phenotypes.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it