An Argument for the New Theory of Photography: Reply to Costello

A philosophical theory is a proposition that is offered as both true and as shedding light on a phenomenon—as helping us to understand it. Since a theory is a proposition, some of the illumination it affords derives from its putting concepts in relation with each other. Since philosophers standardly offer arguments for theories, the concepts deployed in an argument for a theory further illuminate the target phenomenon. Seen against this background, Four Arts of Photography is not standard philosophy (Lopes 2016). The book offers to shed light on photography by articulating a new theory of photography, but it states no explicit argument for the theory. Diarmuid Costello contends that, without an argument, the new theory cannot gain the upper hand over the competition (2017; see also 2018b). What follows makes the implicit argument explicit. Let us begin with a lightning summary of Four Arts of Photography. The book opens with a history of photography twinned with a history of thinking about photography, which brings out a peculiar constellation of ideas that buttressed skepticism about photography's claim to be an art. According to the “skeptic's argument,” (p) a photograph is an image that depicts by belief‐independent feature‐tracking, so (s1) a pure photograph is an image that depicts only by belief‐independent feature‐tracking, and (s2) if a pure photograph is an image that depicts only by belief‐independent feature‐tracking then there can be no interest in it as a depictively expressed thought, but (s3) an image is a representational art work only if there can be an interest in it as a depictively expressed thought, (s4) so no pure photograph is a representational art work, but (s5) photography is an art only if some pure photographs are representational art works, (s6) so photography is not an art. The reflex response, upon encountering a skeptic, is to try to refute them. Since the skeptic's argument is valid, its conclusion is false only if some of its premises are false, and anti‐skeptics go after the premises. By contrast, Four Arts of Photography declares that we need no proof that photography is an art, so its point is not to argue against (p), (s2), (s3), or (s5). Instead, all four claims are treated as false, something is said to explain why we think each is true, and, most importantly, the falsity of each is used to characterize a distinctive photographic art practice. Denying (s5) opens our eyes to abstract photography. Denying (s3) makes sense of modernist photography whose interest lies in affording experiences rather than thoughts. Denying (s2) neatly accommodates tableau photography of the Düsseldorf and Vancouver schools. Denying (p) embraces photography with “manipulation,” named “lyric photography” in the book. In sum, the book turns the tables on the skeptic's argument so as to yield a better understanding of four arts of photography. The traditional or orthodox theory of photography is expressed in (p). Lyric photography calls for a new theory of photography, which must also account for other photographic arts. Several options are on the menu (Phillips 2009, Atencia‐Linares 2012, Lopes 2012, Costello 2018a). According to the version in Four Arts of Photography, (nt) “a photograph is an image output by a mark‐making process taking input from an electro‐chemical event that records information from a light image of a pro‐photographic scene.” (Lopes 2016, 81) Photography is an imaging medium, a four‐stage process for making images that is informational but need not ensure belief‐independent feature‐tracking. Note that photography is not the same as photographic art. The photographic arts are social practices whose norms govern the use of the four stages of the photographic process (see also Lopes 2018b). That is why there can be four arts of photography even as 4 ≠ 1. An argument for (nt) is implicit in the book, but its visibility depends on what form the reader expects it to take. Costello lays down two conditions that a good theory of photography must meet. It must accommodate photographic art and it must “account within in its own terms for the epistemic privilege widely attributed to photographic images” (Costello 2017, 448). For some philosophers, to “accommodate photographic art” is to accommodate intuitions about what counts as a photograph or a work of photographic art. They are apt to test (nt) against counterexamples (Abell 2018, Atencia‐Linares 2018, Costello 2017, Costello 2018a; see Lopes 2018b for replies). The trouble is that our intuitions are theory laden and cannot be trusted, and the same goes for intuitions about photography's epistemic privilege. The alternative is to adopt a second‐order method (see Lopes 2018a). Some philosophy is second order in the sense that the philosopher theorizes about a phenomenon as it is represented in the hypotheses and explanations of empirical scholars. Whereas some metaphysicians craft theories of time to model intuitions about time, philosophers of science usually craft theories of time as it figures in the hypotheses and explanations of physics. Second‐order aesthetics is like philosophy of science: it treats artistic and aesthetic phenomena as ones that figure in the hypotheses and explanations of the behavioral and social sciences. Make the method and Costello's two conditions explicit and the argument for the new theory pops out: the correct theory of photography best models the concept as it figures in empirical explanations, the new theory best models the concept as it figures in empirical arts studies, and the new theory best models the concept as it figures in epistemic explanations, so the new theory is correct. Grant (1) or undertake a valiant defense of conceptual analysis. What about (2) and (3)? The case for (2) is made at great length in Four Arts of Photography. None of the four arts is introduced as a first‐order data point. Each is introduced through standard or classic art historical writing about canonical exemplars. Even historians with outlooks as divergent as those of Douglas Crimp and Michael Fried, for example, turn out to agree on what is canonical. Empirical explanations are not written in stone, of course, and improvement is always possible, but the new theory makes best sense of photography as it figures in the best empirical explanations of those who trade in empirical explanations. By contrast, (p) makes no sense of abstract photography, the tableau photography of the Düsseldorf and Vancouver schools, or lyric photography. That leaves (3). Tradition, represented in (p), makes epistemic quality constitutive of the photographic process. In doing so, it directly explains photography's epistemic privilege. Having distinguished photography as a technical process from the social practices that are the arts of photography, the new theory has resources for an indirect explanation of photography's epistemic privilege. Some social practices govern the use of photography to present evidence, to afford factive experiences, to formulate hypotheses, or to help us to understand the world. Epistemic quality is not constitutive of photography but of certain epistemic practices. Unlike (p), this explains why strict rules govern chains of custody for forensic photography, why journalists are subject to sanctions when they break the rules of photojournalism, and why those rules change over time. The theory does not explain “the epistemic privilege widely attributed to photographic images.” We should know by now that our attributions are wildly unwarranted. The theory does explain the epistemic privilege photographs can earn when subject to the constraints of epistemic practices. We are free to project kinds as we please. One kind, selfies, is made up of shots of S taken by S. Another kind, call it “catsies,” is made up of shots of cats. By the same token, “sphotography” (short for “strict photography”) is made up of products of an apparatus built to secure belief‐independent feature‐tracking. Sphotography is real, and some philosophers are very interested in it (for example, Hopkins 2012, Hopkins 2015). More power to them. The argument for the new theory does not deny the reality of sphotography. Rather, the new theory sheds light on the phenomenon that figures in the writing of art historians as well as the work of forensic scientists and in sociological studies of such topics as propaganda and fake news photography. Is this not the phenomenon onto which we seek to shed light?

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