Capacity Allocation of Game Tickets Using Dynamic Pricing
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
This study examines a pricing approach that is applicable in the field of online ticket sales for game tickets. The mathematical principle of dynamic programing is combined with empirical data analysis to determine demand functions for university football game tickets. Based on the calculated demand functions, the application of DP strategies is found to generate more revenues than a fixed price strategy. The other important result is the capacity distribution of tickets according to the football game intensity. Prior studies have shown that it is sometimes more profitable or football clubs to allocate a share of tickets to a retailer and earn a commission based on the sales, rather than selling the entire capacity of tickets by itself. This paper finds that in a high intensity game, where the demand is generally high, it is optimal for the club to sell all tickets by itself. Whereas, for less popular games, where there is considerable fluctuation in demand, the capacity allocation problem for maximized revenues from ticket sales, becomes a harder optimization challenge for the club. According to DP optimization, when the demand for tickets is relatively low, it is optimal for the club to retain 20–40% of the tickets and the rest of the capacity should be sold to online retailers. In the real world, this pricing technique has been used by football clubs and thus the secondary market online retailers like Ticketmaster and Vivid Seats have become popular in the last decade.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it