MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2984221606 · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2948302

5G Vehicle-to-Everything Services: Gearing Up for Security and Privacy

2019· article· en· W2984221606 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the IEEE · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEngineering
TopicVehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
Canadian institutionsQueen's UniversityUniversity of New Brunswick
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer securityComputer scienceInternet privacySecurity analysisReliability (semiconductor)Security serviceService (business)BusinessInformation security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

5G is emerging to serve as a platform to support networking connections for sensors and vehicles on roads and provide vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services to drivers and pedestrians. 5G V2X communication brings tremendous benefits to us, including improved safety, high reliability, large communication coverage, and low service latency. On the other hand, due to ubiquitous network connectivity, it also presents serious trust, security, and privacy issues toward vehicles, which may impede the success of 5G V2X. In this article, we present a comprehensive survey on the security of 5G V2X services. Specifically, we first review the architecture and the use cases of 5G V2X. We also study a series of trust, security, and privacy issues in 5G V2X services and discuss the potential attacks on trust, security, and privacy in 5G V2X. Then, we offer an in-depth analysis of the state-of-the-art strategies for securing 5G V2X services and elaborate on how to achieve the trust, security, or privacy protection in each strategy. Finally, by pointing out several future research directions, it is expected to draw more attention and efforts into the emerging 5G V2X services.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.633
Threshold uncertainty score0.568

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.005
GPT teacher head0.190
Teacher spread0.185 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it