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Record W2986305485 · doi:10.1109/jproc.2019.2948775

The Security of Autonomous Driving: Threats, Defenses, and Future Directions

2019· article· en· W2986305485 on OpenAlexaff
Kui Ren, Qian Wang, Cong Wang, Zhan Qin, Xiaodong Lin

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the IEEE · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicAdvanced Malware Detection Techniques
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
FundersFundamental Research Funds for the Central UniversitiesResearch Grants Council, University Grants CommitteeNational Natural Science Foundation of China
KeywordsComputer securityControl (management)Computer scienceEmerging technologiesPerceptionRisk analysis (engineering)BusinessArtificial intelligence

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have promised to drastically improve the convenience of driving by releasing the burden of drivers and reducing traffic accidents with more precise control. With the fast development of artificial intelligence and significant advancements of the Internet of Things technologies, we have witnessed the steady progress of autonomous driving over the recent years. As promising as it is, the march of autonomous driving technologies also faces new challenges, among which security is the top concern. In this article, we give a systematic study on the security threats surrounding autonomous driving, from the angles of perception, navigation, and control. In addition to the in-depth overview of these threats, we also summarize the corresponding defense strategies. Furthermore, we discuss future research directions about the new security threats, especially those related to deep-learning-based self-driving vehicles. By providing the security guidelines at this early stage, we aim to promote new techniques and designs related to AVs from both academia and industry and boost the development of secure autonomous driving.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Review · Consensus signal: Review
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.016

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0040.010
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.005
GPT teacher head0.222
Teacher spread0.216 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreReview

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations227
Published2019
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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