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Record W2992503655 · doi:10.1145/3374888.3374893

Optimal Posted Prices for Online Resource Allocation with Supply Costs

2019· article· en· W2992503655 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicOptimization and Search Problems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsValuation (finance)Competitive analysisPaymentBusinessBundleResource (disambiguation)MicroeconomicsEnvironmental economicsResource allocationTotal costComputer scienceIndustrial organizationOperations researchEconomicsFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study a general online resource allocation problem, where a provider sells multiple types of capacity-limited resources to heterogeneous customers that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. The provider charges payment from customers who purchase a bundle of resources but must pay an increasing supply cost with respect to the total resource allocated. The goal is to maximize the social welfare, namely, the total valuation of customers for their purchased bundles, minus the total supply cost of the provider for all the resources that have been allocated. We adopt the competitive analysis framework and provide an optimal posted-pricing mechanism (PPM). Our PPM is optimal in the sense that no other online algorithms can achieve a better competitive ratio.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: Methods
Teacher disagreement score0.945
Threshold uncertainty score0.609

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.003
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.053
GPT teacher head0.337
Teacher spread0.284 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it