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Record W2993269696 · doi:10.1353/sais.2008.0018

Of Note: Is There Room in the Intelligence Community for HSINT?

2008· article· en· W2993269696 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Jennifer Murray

Bibliographic record

Venue˜The œSAIS review of international affairs · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicIntelligence, Security, War Strategy
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsFacilitatorHomeland securityLaw enforcementBureaucracyIntelligence analysisPublic relationsPolitical scienceSociologyLawManagementPublic administrationTerrorismPolitics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Of Note:Is There Room in the Intelligence Community for HSINT? Jennifer Murray After September 11th, it was clear there was an information sharing problem within the Intelligence Community (IC), although it was unclear how to solve the problem. In the minds of many observers, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its intelligence components only muddied the waters. Was 'homeland security' a mission or an agency? Could it be both, and if so, who would take the lead? The early turf battles after DHS's creation led one senior DHS official to quip that the DHS intelligence enterprise was largely "on the outside of the Intelligence Community with its nose pressed against the glass."1 The new department struggled with both the CIA and the FBI in "getting answers to 'hot questions.'"2 Following Secretary Michael Chertoff's Second Stage Review, the intelligence component of DHS headquarters became its own office, the Office of Intelligence & Analysis (OIA). With the feted former CIA veteran Charles Allen as its Chief of Intelligence, OIA set out to ditch its image as "an infant intelligence operation" without a "full-fledged role in the U.S. Intelligence Community."3 Despite these changes and some important departmental successes, such as DHS' being designated to serve as the facilitator of requests from civilian agencies and law enforcement for classified satellite images,4 DHS' role in the Intelligence Community is not without problems. From the perspective of some IC insiders, bureaucratic overlap and infighting remain chief among these problems. The ramping up of the DHS intelligence enterprise might be seen as part of the government's larger response to put more 'players' into the game of counterterrorism, resulting in "more and bigger bureaucratic squad members [and] adding to the tussles over who is responsible for covering which part of the intelligence terrain."5 So the question remains, is there room in the IC for Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT)? The answer lies in some unique contributions that the DHS intelligence enterprise can bring to the IC. First, DHS and its intelligence enterprise have important connections to state, local, and tribal law enforcement. Fundamentally, DHS operates at the ground level, with customs and immigration agents out in the field and with first responder communities spread across the nation. Also, DHS has established 'fusion centers' to facilitate [End Page 141] information sharing. DHS headquarters is actively dispatching intelligence analysts to State and Local Fusion Centers, thus strengthening the bond between the national and sub-national levels. It is doing this to "maximize [cross tier] ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."6 Second, DHS is currently studying the process of radicalization and measures to prevent and counter the radicalization of extremists in the United States.7 In conducting a national assessment of radicalization, DHS is partnering with the academic and scientific communities to take a long-term strategic view of the problems of radicalization and terrorism.8 One only has to look at the July 7, 2005 bombings in London and Great Britain's problem with 'homegrown' terrorists to understand American interest in the process of radicalization. Indeed, the recently passed House Resolution 1955, the "Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007," cites the "significant experience" of Great Britain, Australia, and Canada with homegrown terrorism as an important precipitating cause for DHS' focus on radicalization within the United States.9 In HR 1955, Congress finds that traditional law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism are not independently sufficient and must be coupled with study of the "motivational factors" leading to radicalization and ideologically based violence.10 Congress gave DHS the lead in establishing academic Centers of Excellence, such as the START Center at the University of Maryland, to study the problems of radicalization.11 Third, DHS' Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is reaching out to local communities to spark dialogue to counter radicalization and to develop better relationships between minority communities and DHS.12 Community outreach to counter radicalization has become a "critical element of the [counterterrorism] strategy," and DHS representatives from the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties have engaged community leaders in Los...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.894
Threshold uncertainty score0.802

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0020.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.061
GPT teacher head0.368
Teacher spread0.308 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2008
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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Same venue˜The œSAIS review of international affairsSame topicIntelligence, Security, War StrategyFrench-language works237,207