U.S. Intervention in Siberia as Military Operations Other Than War

The stuff of an age now dead. - S.L.A. Marshall1 If the 1990s are any indication, the mission of the U.S. military is occurring now. Military operations other than war (MOOTW), as in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, will almost certainly become more the rule than the exception during the early 21st century. Given the likelihood of such missions, the need for creating and evolving doctrine is paramount. However, limiting study to solely those operations conducted by U.S. Armed Forces during the 1990s makes creating a truly comprehensive, flexible MOOTW doctrine unlikely. Reevaluating historical events in terms of MOOTW doctrine provides lessons and approaches we can use with profit in future operations. Yet, just as MOOTW requires the U.S. military to develop new skills beyond traditional warfighting, future military historians will not be able to confine themselves strictly to the old description of operations. A broader, deeper approach will be necessary. Fortunately, 20th-century history is rich in potential MOOTW case studies, such as the U.S. intervention in Siberia from 1918 to 1920. Siberia 1918-1920 In July 1918, after months of prodding from World War I allies, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson invited the Japanese to join the U.S. in sending a force of about 7,000 men each to Vladivostok, Russia. The troops' mission was threefold: guard the vast quantity of military stores that had piled up in and around the port; secure the eastern end of the TransSiberian Railway so Czechoslovak troops, who had seized much of the railway in June, could push west and establish contact with their fellows; and steady any efforts at selfgovernment and self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance.2 Wilson was adamant that troops sent to Siberia were not there to take sides in the Russian civil war but, rather, were only to provide a stable environment in which the Russians could determine for themselves what sort of government they might have.3 The American Expeditionary Force (AEF), Siberia, was comprised largely of the U.S. Army's 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments normally based in the Philippines under the command of Major General William Sidney Graves. The British dispatched an infantry regiment from Hong Kong, and the French sent a regiment from Indo-China. Italy, Canada, China, Serbia, Poland, and Rumania also sent token units. Czech forces, numbering around 50,000, largely served west of the Ural Mountains as the spearhead of armies driving on Moscow. The Japanese had the largest number of forces by far. Several divisions, ultimately totaling about 73,000 men, were sent into the Maritime Province of eastern Siberia through Vladivostok and into the Trans-Baikal region in western Siberia through North Manchuria. Although the supreme commander in Siberia was Japanese, most forcesparticularly U.S.-operated under a parallel command structure.4 The area of action in Siberia was vast, stretching over 1,200 air miles from Vladivostok to Irkutsk, just west of Lake Baikal. The most direct route between these two locations transited northern Manchuria. In 1896, the Russians had secured treaty rights to build a railway (the Chinese Eastern) along this direct route, and the railway zone was virtually Russian territory.5 Although Britain and France expressed desire for U.S. and Japanese forces to proceed west of the Urals to attempt reconstituting an eastern front against Germany, both nations declined. For all intents and purposes, Irkutsk marked the westernmost area of operations. Russian authority in the region was generally fragmented, even after Admiral Alexander Kolchak took control of the All Russian White (counterrevolutionary) government at Omsk. Two regional leaders of Cossack armies, Gregory Semenov at Chita in the Trans-Baikal and Ivan Kalmykov in the area around Khabarovsk in the Maritime Province, acted largely independently with more or less open support from the Japanese. …

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