Incentive Effects of Granting Equity-Based Payment on Reducing Top Executive Turnover
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The main focus of the study is to examine the incentive effect of granting equity-based payments for reducing turnover among the executives. In specific, the study was guided on determining the influencing effects of managerial ownership and equity-based payment may reduce executive turnover among the Malaysian Listed companies. From the analysis, the main finding shows that firms with equity-based programme with a presence of family control indicates that turnover is likely to be a lower. This implies that family ties play a significant role for removing of inefficient executives. And, where the family members are also served as the board members, the likelihood to shield from being removed is consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis. Then, extended examination results for the mix pay components of cash and equity reveal the turnover is found to produce less incentive for executives to stay in the firm. The result implies that executives are willing to lose their equity benefits from unexercised value of shares equity and nd the firms fail to restrain executives’ departure as the findings documented in past studies.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".