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Record W3005428264 · doi:10.3982/te2818

Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

2020· article· en· W3005428264 on OpenAlexaff
Tibor Heumann

Bibliographic record

VenueTheoretical Economics · 2020
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMechanism designPrincipal (computer security)Computer scienceEconomic rentConstraint (computer-aided design)Participation constraintMechanism (biology)Profit (economics)Mathematical optimizationEx-anteMathematical economicsArtificial intelligenceMicroeconomicsEconomicsMathematicsComputer securityIncentive

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study a principal–agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit‐maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.013
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.036
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.013
Threshold uncertainty score0.069

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0130.036
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0010.004
Scholarly communication0.0030.007
Open science0.0040.002
Research integrity0.0050.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.086
GPT teacher head0.322
Teacher spread0.236 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations11
Published2020
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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