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Record W3012442074 · doi:10.1109/cdc40024.2019.9029788

Q-Learning with Side Information in Multi-Agent Finite Games

2019· article· en· W3012442074 on OpenAlexaff
Mathieu Sylvestre, Lacra Pavel

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicReinforcement Learning in Robotics
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceHuman–computer interaction

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, we propose a discrete-time Nash equilibrium-seeking reinforcement learning algorithm for n-player finite games which can be adapted to leverage side information when it is available. Under standard assumptions used in stochastic approximation theory, the induced strategies of the discrete-time process converge to a perturbed Nash equilibrium for a class of games characterized by negative monotonicity properties of its utility, which encompasses 2-player zero-sum games and concave potential games. Our convergence results are still valid when no side information is exploited. Through numerical simulations of certain representative games, we show that a faster rate of convergence to a Nash equilibrium can be achieved when more side information is available and exploited.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: Simulation or modeling
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.874
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.014
GPT teacher head0.229
Teacher spread0.215 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2019
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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