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Record W3012999264

The Regulation of Occupations and Labour Market Outcomes in Canada: Three Essays on the Relationship between Occupational Licensing, Earnings and Internal Labour Mobility

2017· dissertation· en· W3012999264 on OpenAlex
Tingting Zhang

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace · 2017
Typedissertation
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicOccupational and Professional Licensing Regulation
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEarningsOccupational mobilityLabour economicsEconomicsBusinessAccounting
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The thesis begins with an introductory chapter that discusses the current state of occupational licensing research and motivates the analysis through the importance of occupational licensing, similar to unionization, to both labour market theory and public policy. The first paper in this thesis asks whether or not Canadian licensed workers earn higher wages than unlicensed workers. The paper also compares licensing pay premium to union wage premium. Based on longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) from 1993 to 2011, a pay premium of approximately 12.0% is estimated for occupational licensing, slightly higher than the union wage premium, as 9.0%. These results are based on a cross-section of respondents using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates. Fixed-effect estimates from the longitudinal data (2.6% and 4.0% for licensing and unionization, respectively), however, are much lower than the OLS amounts, suggesting the importance of unobservable factors that are correlated with licensing and union status in determining the wage premium of workers. The second paper further investigates whether or not wage premiums are uniform across the wage distribution. Using unconditional quantile regression methods, I investigated how occupational licensing and unionization impact the wage distribution of Canadian workers between 1998 and 2014. Unionization decreases wage inequality in upper-wage earners, but increases wage inequality in lower-wage earners. Occupational licensing, on the other hand, increases inequality across the entire wage distribution. The third paper focuses on the impacts of occupational licensing and unionization on young workers inter-provincial mobility decision. Using Canadian Longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) from 1993 to 2010, the results of both multilevel modeling analysis and linear probability models with clustered standard errors show that, unlike unionization which restricts labour mobility, individualsâ licensing status is not correlated with the likelihood of moving across provincial boundaries for young Canadians aged 21-34. The final component of the thesis is an Appendix that presents a newly constructed occupational licensing index, which is based on an authoritative Canadian jurisdictional review. I define occupational licensing based on the exclusive-right-to-practice clause, and occupational certification based on the exclusive-right-to-title clause in the legislation, and construct licensing indicators to carry the empirical analyses of the effects of occupational licensing in Canada.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.276
Threshold uncertainty score0.715

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.053
GPT teacher head0.310
Teacher spread0.257 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it