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Record W301562470 · doi:10.5325/soundings.96.3.0237

Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live?

2013· article· en· W301562470 on OpenAlex
James F. Childress

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
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Bibliographic record

VenueSoundings An Interdisciplinary Journal · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldMedicine
TopicOrgan Donation and Transplantation
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInternet privacyComputer science

Abstract

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Who shall live when not all can live? Although this question has been urgently forced upon us by the dramatic use of artificial internal organs and organ transplantations, it is hardly new. George Bernard Shaw dealt with it in “The Doctor's Dilemma”: Sir Patrick.Well, Mr. Savior of Lives: which is it to be? That honest decent man Blenkinsop, or that rotten blackguard of an artist, eh?Ridgeon.It's not an easy case to judge, is it? Blenkinsop's an honest decent man; but is he any use? Dubedat's a rotten blackguard; but he's a genuine source of pretty and pleasant and good things.Sir Patrick.What will he be a source of for that poor innocent wife of his, when she finds him out?Ridgeon.That's true. Her life will be a hell.Sir Patrick.And tell me this. Suppose you had this choice put before you: either to go through life and find all the pictures bad but all the men and women good, or go through life and find all the pictures good and all the men and women rotten. Which would you choose?1 A significant example of the distribution of scarce medical resources is seen in the use of penicillin shortly after its discovery. Military officers had to determine which soldiers would be treated—those with venereal disease or those wounded in combat.2 In many respects such decisions have become routine in medical circles. Day after day physicians and others make judgments and decisions “about allocations of medical care to various segments of our population, to various types of hospitalized patients, and to specific individuals,”3 for example, whether mental illness or cancer will receive the higher proportion of available funds. Nevertheless, the dramatic forms of “Scarce Life-Saving Medical Resources” (hereafter abbreviated as SLMR) such as hemodialysis and kidney and heart transplants have compelled us to examine the moral questions that have been concealed in many routine decisions. I do not attempt in this paper to show how a resolution of SLMR cases can help us in the more routine ones which do not involve a conflict of life with life. Rather I develop an argument for a particular method of determining who shall live when not all can live. No conclusions are implied about criteria and procedures for determining who shall receive medical resources that are not directly related to the preservation of life (e.g. corneal transplants) or about standards for allocating money and time for studying and treating certain diseases.Just as current SLMR decisions are not totally discontinuous with other medical decisions, so we must ask whether some other cases might, at least by analogy, help us develop the needed criteria and procedures. Some have looked at the principles at work in our responses to abortion, euthanasia, and artificial insemination.4 Usually they have concluded that these cases do not cast light on the selection of patients for artificial and transplanted organs. The reason is evident: in abortion, euthanasia, and artificial insemination, there is no conflict of life with life for limited but indispensable resources (with the possible exception of therapeutic abortion). In current SLMR decisions, such a conflict is inescapable, and it makes them so morally perplexing and fascinating. If analogous cases are to be found, I think that we shall locate them in moral conflict situations.An especially interesting and pertinent one is U.S. v. Holmes.5 In 1841 an American ship, the William Brown, which was near Newfoundland on a trip from Liverpool to Philadelphia, struck an iceberg. The crew and half the passengers were able to escape in the two available vessels. One of these, a longboat, carrying too many passengers and leaking seriously, began to founder in the turbulent sea after about twenty-four hours. In a desperate attempt to keep it from sinking, the crew threw over board fourteen men. Two sisters of one of the men either jumped overboard to join their brother in death or instructed the crew to throw them over. The criteria for determining who should live were “not to part man and wife, and not to throw over any women.” Several hours later the others were rescued. Returning to Philadelphia, most of the crew disappeared, but one, Holmes, who had acted upon orders from the mate, was indicted, tried, and convicted on the charge of “unlawful homicide.”We are interested in this case from a moral rather than a legal standpoint, and there are several possible responses to and judgments about it. Without attempting to be exhaustive I shall sketch a few of these. The judge contended that lots should have been cast, for in such conflict situations, there is no other procedure “so consonant both to humanity and to justice.” Counsel for Holmes, on the other hand, maintained that the “sailors adopted the only principle of selection which was possible in an emergency like theirs,—a principle more humane than lots.”Another version of selection might extend and systematize the maxims of the sailors in the direction of “utility”; those are saved who will contribute to the greatest good for the greatest number. Yet another possible option is defended by Edmond Cahn in The Moral Decision. He argues that in this case we encounter the “morals of the last days.” By this phrase he indicates that an apocalyptic crisis renders totally irrelevant the normal differences between individuals. He continues, In a strait of this extremity, all men are reduced—or raised, as one may choose to denominate it—to members of the genus, mere congeners and nothing else. Truly and literally, all were “in the same boat,” and thus none could be saved separately from the others. I am driven to conclude that otherwise—that is, if none sacrifice themselves of free will to spare the others—they must all wait and die together. For where all have become congeners, pure and simple, no one can save himself by killing another.6 Cahn's answer to the question “who shall live when not all can live” is “none” unless the voluntary sacrifice by some persons permits it.Few would deny the importance of Cahn's approach although many, including this writer, would suggest that it is relevant mainly as an affirmation of an elevated and, indeed, heroic or saintly morality which one hopes would find expression in the voluntary actions of many persons trapped in “borderline” situations involving a conflict of life with life. It is a maximal demand which some moral principles impose on the individual in the recognition that self-preservation is not a good which is to be defended at all costs. The absence of this saintly or heroic morality should not mean, however, that everyone perishes. Without making survival an absolute value and without justifying all means to achieve it, we can maintain that simply letting everyone die is irresponsible. This charge can be supported from several different standpoints, including society at large as well as the individuals involved. Among a group of self-interested individuals, none of whom volunteers to relinquish his life, there may be better and worse ways of determining who shall survive. One task of social ethics, whether religious or philosophical, is to propose relatively just institutional arrangements—which criteria and procedures of selection is most satisfactory in view of the human condition (man's limited altruism and inclination to seek his own good) and the conflicting values that are to be realized?There are several significant differences between the Holmes and SLMR cases, a major one being that the former involves direct killing of another person, while the latter involve only permitting a person to die when it is not possible to save all. Furthermore, in extreme situations such as Holmes, the restraints of civilization have been stripped away, and something approximating a state of nature prevails, in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” The state of nature does not mean that moral standards are irrelevant and that might should prevail, but it does suggest that much of the matrix which normally supports morality has been removed. Also the necessary but unfortunate decisions about who shall live and die are made by men who are existentially and personally involved in the outcome. Their survival too is at stake. Even though the institutional role of sailors seems to require greater sacrificial actions, there is obviously no assurance that they will adequately assess the number of sailors required to man the vessel or that they will impartially and objectively weigh the common good at stake. As the judge insisted in his defense of casting lots in the Holmes case: “In no other than this [casting lots] or some like way are those having equal rights put upon an equal footing, and in no other way is it possible to guard against partiality and oppression, violence, and conflict.” This difference should not be exaggerated since self-interest, professional pride, and the like obviously affect the outcome of many medical decisions. Nor do the remaining differences cancel Holmes' instructiveness.Which set of arrangements should be adopted for SLMR? Two questions are involved: Which standards and criteria should be used? And, Who should make the decision? The first question is basic, since the debate about implementation, e.g. whether by a lay committee or physician, makes little progress until the criteria are determined.We need two sets of criteria which will be applied at two different stages in the selection of recipients of SLMR. First, medical criteria should be used to exclude those who are not “medically acceptable.” Second, from this group of “medically acceptable” applicants, the final selection can be made. Occasionally in current American medical practice, the first stage is omitted, but such an omission is unwarranted. Ethical and social responsibility would seem to require distributing these SLMR only to those who have some reasonable prospect of responding to the treatment. Furthermore, in transplants such medical tests as tissue and blood typing are necessary, although they are hardly fully developed.“Medical is not as as many since there is debate in medical about the relevant and Although can contribute little or nothing to this two may be in First, should be used only to determine the group from which the final selection will be and the attempt to of to should be Medical would exclude some but would not as a of between those who the first For example, if two for were the physicians would not choose the one with the better medical selection would be made on other Second, and should be to an absolute and should be only when they are without related to medical the to with the of which might to most significant moral questions when we to the final the of has been and the number is than the other criteria should be used? should the final selection be First, I shall examine some of the that from to make the final selection in of social these about the and of the I shall the possible for selection or criteria of social on but most they are The and to the society is although this obviously be from his of and the of his to society an is in of these social and has been to suggest the of that affect social value or we encounter the first major of this do we determine the relevant criteria of social of various social are only too does one and the of the life, that day we may how to or or the value in in the same and way that has I am not that we can or that we should attempt to do if the various social and human in could be how do we determine how much we will to Which will have in case of more in the light of which values and principles do we social possible way of determining the values which should be in selection has been by He that our medical decisions about allocating resources are on an of values by there is no way of we should be and about it. should we He that we the values that most in our society and use them as criteria for distributing SLMR. values can be by or if in this put a greater on than men would have a greater on our SLMR than of is significant and the who was SLMR in might be in as the greatest American since George is criteria that could be applied but at the and as well as individual the criteria of social value that are used in is this more than in the and decisions of the selection committee of the where such as and have been significant for determining who shall As two conclude after these criteria and they who the the way but who have so much to the making of The is no for a with bad to this first of determining social values is a only is it if not to on social but it is easy to our will be in a few and the of actions will it is to which persons will their in in and the of of For these as has might be a but we simply the to the which we must is more than when we think in make us that such an approach to SLMR is the of but this should not be The on another the approach would in the person to his social and it and the of the his as a person which be to his or to It is not at all that we are to live with these of who the artificial has we to the principle that social should determine we patients to be with only when they are go to have have a a good and to the that any for for selection is a to the of view which The is not to all but to that SLMR cases are which involve The however, can have and for from by and can go and seek for criteria for the question of life or death in the of the artificial these criteria to the of human the to which they can be little more than that at by casting The he will be to those in American medical is most to a certain or in of which when is this of the and where it only as a and It only us how all selection criteria and procedures the to us in the of the human condition and its This approach is with his view of the task of us how to and ethics, I would can help us the and in light judgments can be made. Even if all actions in SLMR should involve some may human to a greater than others. that a on any criteria is more than that at by casting selection by would the to the moral and values that we are to maintain a of is that we use some of or such as first or such as a to determine who shall be as a to when and judgments can and must be made. Edmond Cahn who the casting of lots as Cahn it, crisis involves too for and too for other as a to which human these values are with the of it is to have persons rather than determining who shall they are with the outcome of the the such as and of being which make human life it is are to be and in the the it must be that the use of seems and the of criteria in SLMR to make their as and as possible so that does not determine who shall however, the moral and values which might be supported by selection by or A more is that the procedure that I develop the relevant moral too That so the argument might the society and its and not the individual with his illness and upon SLMR. is that the values and principles at work in the may well over those in the both of their and and of the of selection in of social As “The more is the to be made of an and the more the life and the more the for human as a moral principle I is in certain conflict situations, it a significant of by of it be as a and procedure without an the including human which might it. this about the Holmes case: of our upon as the all the and the in our should think rather of of as the of the of those individuals to one another that might have been and by casting The and which on the approach would be in his social role and can be and to by a recognition of his equal to be a is by procedures which of selection by more the by human than does It is not but it is to the of letting all die or only those who have the greatest social and argument can be by values other than individual and of value in the medical is the of between and Which selection criteria are most in with this of Which will and it? is that selection by or is from this which is to for human is an of about It is not simply the that another will a particular but more that another will him in certain will him as a As Although has to do with on a of another person, it is on a of a the to to with or live to and so to another is first of all to him to the principle of morality in his with to as a person, This be in situations when a person decisions about him to be made in of his social for such decisions his as a on of in social value or would have reason for that his had been the that one is being not as an in himself but as a means in medical progress or the of a greater social good is with and of this in the which was after the after the first heart The of between the and is not only an value in the of being an in the treatment. It is to be of its as a the related values of individual and are maintained in selection by other the argument for this Which criteria and procedures would men have to a in which several men are to determine for themselves and their the criteria and procedures by which they would to be to and from SLMR if the need need to two and ask which set of criteria and procedures would be as the most and, indeed, the The are The men are are interested in their own that of members of their and of they are not by Furthermore, they are of their own and to the social do not how they would in a the for SLMR in of social these which would be all or the use of Which would seem the most The By which set of criteria would they to be in or from the of those who will be The choice in this and of would be selection or since this of A possible is that one would to a and choose the I think especially since I that the in this are for their as well as for selection or could be more to the It would make more for men who are self-interested but about their to society to a set of criteria which would in of would selection by as relatively just and for or The and those who are would be greater if the is on social than if it is on and be in these situations, but they would be by the of being relatively by makes this A to would make for the and those who have a specific in It would be for them to his by relatively of criteria in is involved. the of life have us to the of and to the of or human life is an after has an absolute to most of us would that we have as much to it as in Although it is as selection by is in in I am not of any which some of its patients from kidney in to make for later who are better in of social Furthermore, few would it. few would a person from a kidney on the that a person better had just In a of the of by at the of from to patients but were not the had its of in and is at least certain is that we extend this principle first to determine who the patients shall live or that we artificial such as a or first would be more than a since the make their over a of time rather than as a group at one This procedure would be in with at least one principle in our and with our of individual and in to these values can be by how the can be to the one easy way of this task is to maintain the of which to a patients are not that they are being for SLMR in to the treatment. whether is or not is not the significant it is rather for would be most to the is that can be more if of and are and that they are by selection by or has another since it would the need for a committee to examine in of their social This responsibility can be there is a possible of use of selection which is interesting to although I do not it as a good reason for It can be as of the of has that SLMR cases would if these scarce resources were rather than on social would no be a the of and would make certain that they would not be by a selection they would help to or so that medical would be and the that I have are the of to be without If we would we not just after we had in it The direction of argument has been against any and I would this as the way to me one possible way of while at the same time them so that they would be of the approach is that which make it necessary to that one man is indispensable for a society in view of a particular set of it the when the is a for the argument to this has that the of would on those who think that the social in this is so that they simply by the outcome of a or a first first the reason must be rather than that is, we from in this not we to of this to the of our but his would be the in a social value the should be used as a of exception in for example, only if it would a reason to another person from a kidney if all were this to the has been made to we would be to put this of another for a only if we would be in which all are being to a by from it. would make an exception I do not this procedure of I think that one can it while about selection by or If it is a lay committee would be upon to with the since the or others would in be the outcome of or This lay committee would determine whether this was so indispensable at this time and that he had to be saved by the values by It would make it that exception is if at only as the of two a defense would be only if and so many moral and values in SLMR

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.607
Threshold uncertainty score0.993

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.026
GPT teacher head0.319
Teacher spread0.294 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it