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Record W3021016936

Choosing and Sharing

2007· preprint· en· W3021016936 on OpenAlexaff
Jérémy Laurent‐Lucchetti, Justin Leroux

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2007
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsCenter for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on OrganizationsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsExternalityMechanism (biology)Nash equilibriumOutcome (game theory)Simple (philosophy)MicroeconomicsBusinessRisk analysis (engineering)Control (management)Host (biology)Computer scienceEconomicsOperations researchEngineeringManagement
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Choosing a project for which benefits accrue to all involved agents but brings major costs or additional benefits to only one agent is often problematic. Sit-ing a nationwide nuclear waste disposal or hosting a major sporting event are examples of such a problem: costs or benefits are tied to the identity of the host of the project. Our goals are twofold: to choose the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost or the highest localized surplus) and to share the exact cost, or surplus, with total control over realized transfers. We propose a simple mechanism to implement both objectives. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is efficient, budget-balanced and immune to coalitional deviations.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.342
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.079
GPT teacher head0.318
Teacher spread0.239 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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