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Record W3021016936

Choosing and Sharing

2007· preprint· en· W3021016936 on OpenAlexaff
Jérémy Laurent‐Lucchetti, Justin Leroux

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2007
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsCenter for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on OrganizationsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsExternalityMechanism (biology)Nash equilibriumOutcome (game theory)Simple (philosophy)MicroeconomicsBusinessRisk analysis (engineering)Control (management)Host (biology)Computer scienceEconomicsOperations researchEngineeringManagement
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Choosing a project for which benefits accrue to all involved agents but brings major costs or additional benefits to only one agent is often problematic. Siting a nationwide nuclear waste disposal or hosting a major sporting event are examples of such a problem: costs or benefits are tied to the identity of the host of the project. Our goals are twofold: to choose the efficient site (the host with the lowest cost or the highest localized surplus) and to share the cost, or surplus, in a predetermined way so as to achieve redistributive goals. We propose a simple mechanism to implement both objectives. The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of our mechanism coincides with truthtelling, is efficient, budget-balanced and immune to coalitional deviations.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.020
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.037
Threshold uncertainty score0.124

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.020
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.004
Scholarly communication0.0040.007
Open science0.0020.004
Research integrity0.0030.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0370.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.079
GPT teacher head0.318
Teacher spread0.239 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueRePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsSame topicGame Theory and Voting SystemsFrench-language works237,207