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Record W3043086594 · doi:10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16675

Almost Envy-freeness, Envy-rank, and Nash Social Welfare Matchings

2021· preprint· en· W3043086594 on OpenAlex
Alireza Farhadi, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Mohamad Latifian, Masoud Seddighin, Hadi Yami

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence · 2021
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMathematical economicsMatching (statistics)Nash equilibriumMathematicsRank (graph theory)Social WelfareCombinatoricsStatisticsLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of envy-freeness for the case of indivisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents with subadditive valuations. In sharp contrast, it is unknown whether or not an EFX allocation always exists, even for four agents and additive valuations. In addition, the best approximation guarantee for EFX is (φ − 1) ≃ 0.61 by Amanitidis et al.. In order to find a middle ground to bridge this gap, in this paper we suggest another fairness criterion, namely envy-freeness up to a random good or EFR, which is weaker than EFX, yet stronger than EF1. For this notion, we provide a polynomial-time 0.73-approximation allocation algorithm. For our algorithm we introduce Nash Social Welfare Matching which makes a connection between Nash Social Welfare and envy freeness.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.045
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.096
GPT teacher head0.267
Teacher spread0.171 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it