Evaluating intrusion sensitivity allocation with supervised learning in collaborative intrusion detection
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Summary Network intrusions are a big security threat to current computer networks. For protection, collaborative intrusion detection networks (CIDNs) are developed attempting to reach better detection performance than a single detector, by allowing a set of detectors to switch data or information with each other. However, there is a need to implement suitable trust management schemes, with the aim to safeguard such distributed detection networks against insider threats. In the literature, previous studies have indicated that the notion of intrusion sensitivity can be used to enhance the effectiveness of trust management, by highlighting the feedback from expert nodes. In addition, machine learning can be used to assign the value of intrusion sensitivity automatically. In this work, we evaluate the performance of typical supervised learning classifiers in allocating the value of intrusion sensitivity, and figure out some limitations under different data sets. Then we investigate the impact of intrusion sensitivity in a real network environment under adversarial conditions. The results demonstrate that a wrongly assigned sensitivity value may greatly degrade the detection effectiveness of insider attacks. There is a significant need to choose a suitable classifier in allocating the value of intrusion sensitivity in practice.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.011 | 0.029 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".