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Record W3089003244 · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3666

Preference Elicitation for Participatory Budgeting

2020· article· en· W3089003244 on OpenAlexaff
Gerdus Benadè, Swaprava Nath, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah

Bibliographic record

VenueManagement Science · 2020
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsParticipatory budgetingPreference elicitationKnapsack problemPreferenceVotingSocial choice theoryValue (mathematics)Citizen journalismMicroeconomicsEconomicsComputer scienceOperations researchPolitical scienceMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most of this new paradigm requires rethinking some of the basics of computational social choice, including the very way in which individuals express their preferences. We attempt to maximize social welfare by using observed votes as proxies for voters’ unknown underlying utilities, and analytically compare four preference elicitation methods: knapsack votes, rankings by value or value for money, and threshold approval votes. We find that threshold approval voting is qualitatively superior, and also performs well in experiments using data from real participatory budgeting elections. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.015
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.057
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.078

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0150.057
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.003
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0030.004
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0150.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.238
GPT teacher head0.277
Teacher spread0.039 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations57
Published2020
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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