The effects of financial and non-financial incentives on job tenure
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of financial and non-financial incentives on job tenure of academics in Jordanian universities. The purpose of this research is to help Jordanian universities find solutions to the job tenure challenge that they face and to explore the role of incentives in job tenure. The study follows the incentives typology of Buchan and incentives are divided into two categories; financial incentive, including salary, other direct financial incentives, and indirect financial incentives, and non-financial incentives including training and education, recreational facilities, occupational health, and flexible working hours, breaks, and sabbatical. Job tenure is measured by the period that the questionnaire respondents were working with the current employers. The study considers two hypotheses and two questions to test the effect of incentives on job tenure. Results show that financial and non-financial incentives had positive significant effects on job tenure. The study recommends universities in Jordan to pay more attention to incentive given to their academics when they aim to increase job tenure.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it