A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Opportunities for Engagement

A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Strengths, Weaknesses, and Opportunities for Engagement Joanne Wallis (bio), Sujan R. Chinoy, Natalie Sambhi, and Jeffrey Reeves (bio) [End Page 1] Introduction Jeffrey Reeves and Joanne Wallis In 2007, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe proposed that if Japan and India were to come together, it would coalesce a “broader Asia” that would be “open and transparent” and “allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.”1 Abe’s speech marked the emergence on the international stage of the idea that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are linked in a strategic arc, and that this region should be free and open. Abe’s commitment to this idea solidified during his second term in office (2012–14), culminating in his launching of Japan’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy in 2016, with the goals of “freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous.”2 Since then, Japan has successfully promoted its FOIP concept. In 2017, U.S. president Donald Trump explicitly adopted FOIP language, stating that “I’ve had the honor of sharing our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific—a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.”3 However, while the FOIP concept exists as a strategy in Japan and the United States, in India and Australia it is primarily treated as a normative framing, and in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an “outlook.”4 Pacific Island states have been the most wary about adopting a [End Page 2] FOIP concept.5 Like the Southeast Asian states, they are concerned that the Indo-Pacific framing implies that smaller states will inevitably have to make a strategic choice “between a ‘China alternative’ and our traditional partners.”6 That the definition of the FOIP concept remains open to interpretation is a potential strength because states can adapt the concept to their circumstances. But this is also its greatest weakness because this elasticity means that the concept may be incapable of shaping a future regional security order. Moreover, that certain versions—particularly the one articulated by the Trump administration—clearly define China as an adversary makes the concept unattractive to many smaller, risk-averse states worried about exacerbating China’s strategic vulnerability. With the FOIP concept still under development, in January 2020 the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada hosted a conference in Vancouver at which speakers from Australia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States outlined their respective views on the Indo-Pacific idea. This roundtable is a joint project of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Both institutions featured participants at the conference and belong to the Asia Policy consortium. This roundtable features a selection of essays on the FOIP idea, some presented at the conference and some drafted in retrospect. These essays, and other contributions at the conference, reveal that while interpretations of the FOIP concept differ, each country shares an understanding that interconnectivity—whether economic, security, political, or people-to-people—is key. Therefore, in its most fundamental form, the FOIP concept is about realizing a two-ocean, two-continent strategy to build an inclusive mega-region. As the concept can also be read as code for containing China, particularly given that the main proponents of the concept—Australia, Japan, India, and the United States—have recently revived the Quad format, this suggests that it is important to emphasize interconnectivity and inclusivity as key principles of any aspirational FOIP vision in order to advance economic development and promote interregional engagement and stability. [End Page 3] Participants at the conference acknowledged questions over what role “values” should play in the concept, given that this may challenge its attractiveness as a region-wide organizing principle. For example, while the Quad members have emphasized the importance of democracy, not all Asian states see shared democratic values or a democratically aligned rules-based order as necessary preconditions for state relations. There is also no consensus on...

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