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Record W3116827133 · doi:10.4230/lipics.isaac.2020.39

Market Pricing for Matroid Rank Valuations

2020· article· en· W3116827133 on OpenAlexaff
Kristóf Bérczi, Naonori Kakimura, Yusuke Kobayashi

Bibliographic record

VenueDROPS (Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz Center for Informatics) · 2020
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsToronto Metropolitan University
FundersDivision of Mathematical SciencesNemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovaciós AlapResearch Institute for Mathematical SciencesJapan Society for the Promotion of ScienceInnovációs és Technológiai MinisztériumNemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs HivatalMagyar Tudományos Akadémia
KeywordsMatroidWeighted matroidCombinatoricsRank (graph theory)Graphic matroidMathematicsMatroid partitioningPartition (number theory)ConjectureBase (topology)Discrete mathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing social welfare in combinatorial markets through pricing schemes. We consider the existence of prices that are capable to achieve optimal social welfare without a central tie-breaking coordinator. In the case of two buyers with matroid rank valuations, we give polynomial-time algorithms that always find such prices when one of the matroids is a simple partition matroid or both matroids are strongly base orderable. This result partially answers a question raised by Düetting and Végh in 2017. We further formalize a weighted variant of the conjecture of Düetting and Végh, and show that the weighted variant can be reduced to the unweighted one based on the weight-splitting theorem for weighted matroid intersection by Frank. We also show that a similar reduction technique works for M^♮-concave functions, or equivalently, for gross substitutes functions.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.769
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.052
GPT teacher head0.247
Teacher spread0.195 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2020
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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