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Record W3121146952

Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency

2000· preprint· en· W3121146952 on OpenAlexaff
Michael Peters

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2000
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsNegotiationSimple (philosophy)Agency (philosophy)Class (philosophy)Computer scienceMicroeconomicsMathematical economicsEconomicsPolitical scienceSociologyEpistemologyLawArtificial intelligence
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper considers the validity of assuming that principals make their common agent a single take it or leave it contract offer instead of negotiating over the contract in a more complex way. Interest in this question arises from recent examples in the literature that illustrate equilibrium allocations that can be supported with negotiation, but not with simple take it or leave it offers. It is shown that with symmetric information, pure strategy equilibrium persist as equilibria no matter what mechanisms are available to principals. With asymmetric information, pure strategy equilibria in naive direct mechanisms will similarly persist. We also provide a class of environments in which 'pure strategy' equilibria with negotiation can all be supported with simple take it or leave it offers. The environment is restrictive, but encompasses the environments assumed in many popular papers on common agency, as well as the environment involved in a simple Bertrand pricing problem. ...

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.020
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.011
Threshold uncertainty score0.054

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.020
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0060.015
Scholarly communication0.0110.019
Open science0.0020.008
Research integrity0.0050.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.078
GPT teacher head0.312
Teacher spread0.234 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2000
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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