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Record W3121297529

Paying Hospital-Based Doctors: Fee for Whose Service?

2013· article· en· W3121297529 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Åke Blomqvist

Bibliographic record

VenueC.D. Howe Institute Commentary · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPaymentFee-for-serviceIncentiveBusinessService (business)Quality (philosophy)Health careFinanceActuarial scienceMarketingEconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Canadian specialist doctors are paid mainly through fee-for-service for the procedures they perform. Nationwide, more than 80 percent of surgical specialists’ income comes from fee-for-service payments that are negotiated collectively with provincial health ministries. Surgical specialists make up about 20 percent of all full-time equivalent physicians, and fee-for-service payments to them accounted for close to $4 billion nationwide in 2011/12. Because physicians’ decisions are the major drivers for most healthcare costs, getting the incentives right regarding the way doctors are paid is critical in ensuring Canadians receive good value for money from the healthcare system. Whereas most hospital-based specialist doctors are paid via fee-for-service by provincial insurance plans, most hospital funding comes through a separate pipe, in the form of lump-sum amounts not linked to the number and quality of services provided. The result is a system in which neither specialists’ time nor hospital resources are efficiently used, contributing to high costs and long waiting lists. One contributing factor to waiting lists, and one reason why many recently graduated specialists in Canada are unemployed or underemployed, is a lack of complementary facilities, such as operating rooms, and the lack of complementary professionals, such as anaesthesiologists, nurses and so on. When a medical procedure requires hospital facilities as well as specialist time, the fee should be shared between hospitals and specialists in ways that give both a stake in producing high-quality care at low costs. We propose that hospital-based physicians be paid directly from hospital budgets as opposed to the current practice of paying them separately through provincial insurance plans. Hospitals would then engage doctors and pay them appropriately – either by salary, fee-for-service, or a blend of methods. This would result in stronger incentives for providers to better deploy resources but may also lead to potential side effects, such as cost shifting and lower quality of care. In this Commentary, we discuss how incentives to both hospitals and doctors could be carefully designed to avoid pitfalls and to promote more efficient use of resources.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.049
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Commentary · Consensus signal: Commentary
Teacher disagreement score0.300
Threshold uncertainty score0.597

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.049
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0060.010
Scholarly communication0.0110.010
Open science0.0030.004
Research integrity0.0100.009
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0130.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.060
GPT teacher head0.266
Teacher spread0.206 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreCommentary

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2013
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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