Spatial Differentiation and Vertical Mergers in Retail Markets for Gasoline
Why is this work in the frame?
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame — the usual design — would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.
The three-model screen
all 1,000 screened works →All three models called this out of scope.
Empirical industrial organization study of spatial competition in gasoline retail.
The paper studies gasoline-market competition and mergers rather than research practice.
Industrial-organization economics of gasoline markets and mergers, not research evaluation.
Abstract
This paper studies an empirical model of spatial competition applied to gasoline markets. The main feature is to specify commuting paths as the “locations'' of consumers in a Hotelling-style model. As a result, spatial differentiation depends in an intuitive way on the structure of the road network and the direction of traffic flows. The model is estimated using panel data on the Quebec City gasoline market and used to evaluate the consequences of a recent vertical merger. Difference-in-difference and counterfactual simulation methods are compared, and the results, to a large extent, validate the assumptions of the demand model. (JEL G34, L13, L42, L81, Q41, R41)
Stored with the screening record, where it is evidence for the labels above.
The record
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Topic
- Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Field
- Business, Management and Accounting
- Canadian institutions
- —
- Funders
- —
- Keywords
- Counterfactual thinkingCompetition (biology)Panel dataEconomicsGasolineEconometricsProduct differentiationMicroeconomicsMarket shareIndustrial organizationCournot competitionEngineering
- Has abstract in OpenAlex
- yes