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Record W3121489284 · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12225

Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance

2017· article· en· W3121489284 on OpenAlexafffund
Decio Coviello, Luigi Moretti, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Paola Valbonesi

Bibliographic record

VenueScandinavian Journal of Economics · 2017
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
FundersVetenskapsrådetUniversità degli Studi di PadovaCanada Research ChairsAgence Nationale de la Recherche
KeywordsInefficiencyProcurementPaymentOrder (exchange)BusinessWork (physics)Simple (philosophy)Law and economicsEconomicsMicroeconomicsFinanceMarketingEngineering

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, thereby inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. Where courts are inefficient, we find the following: public works are delivered with longer delays; delays increase for more valuable contracts; contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.012
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.101
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.027
Threshold uncertainty score0.090

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0120.101
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0040.008
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0060.003
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0270.004

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.037
GPT teacher head0.221
Teacher spread0.184 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations96
Published2017
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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