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Record W3121785314 · doi:10.1257/mic.20150147

Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes

2018· article· en· W3121785314 on OpenAlexaff
Deniz Dizdar

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMultiplicity (mathematics)MicroeconomicsMatching (statistics)Investment (military)Ex-anteSimple (philosophy)Industrial organizationInvestment decisionsEconomicsComputer scienceEconometricsMathematical optimizationMathematical economicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Heterogeneous buyers and sellers must make investments before entering a continuum assignment market. I show that efficient ex post contracting equilibria (Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b) exist in a general assignment game framework. I then shed light on what enables and what precludes coordination failures. A simple condition—absence of technological multiplicity—guarantees efficient investments for each pair, but a mismatch of agents may still occur. However, using optimal transport theory, I also show that mismatch is heavily constrained in certain multidimensional environments with differentiated agents and no technological multiplicity. Under technological multiplicity, even extreme ex ante heterogeneity need not preclude inefficiencies. (JEL C78, D41, D86)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.015
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.012
Threshold uncertainty score0.040

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.015
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0030.005
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0120.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.017
GPT teacher head0.228
Teacher spread0.211 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations11
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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