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Record W3121836974 · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12237

Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation

2018· article· en· W3121836974 on OpenAlexaff
Josef Schroth

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Accounting Research · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicAuditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Canadian institutionsBank of Canada
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEquity (law)IncentiveStock priceStock optionsBusinessStock (firearms)Compensation (psychology)MicroeconomicsEmpirical evidenceEconomicsExecutive compensationFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

ABSTRACT This paper studies the role of optimal managerial compensation in reducing uncertainty about manager reporting objectives. It is shown that, paradoxically, firm owners allow managers with higher propensity to manipulate the short‐term stock price to push for higher powered and more short‐term‐focused equity incentives. Such managers also work harder, and manipulate more, but may not generate higher firm profits. The model is consistent with existing empirical findings about the relationship between manipulation and equity pay, suggesting that heterogeneity in manager manipulation propensities may be an important driver of heterogeneity in pay. Novel testable predictions are developed.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.009
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMetaresearch
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.395
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.009
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.002
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.045
GPT teacher head0.314
Teacher spread0.269 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations23
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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