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Record W3122260482

Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting

2019· preprint· en· W3122260482 on OpenAlexaff
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2019
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsOrthantMonotonic functionVotingMathematicsBasis (linear algebra)Orthogonal basisNormalityMathematical economicsNorm (philosophy)Incentive compatibilityCombinatoricsIncentiveStatisticsEconomicsMathematical analysisGeometryMicroeconomicsPolitical science
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We study issue-by-issue voting and robust mechanism design in multidimensional frameworks where privately informed agents have preferences induced by general norms. We uncover the deep connections between dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) on the one hand, and several geometric/functional analytic concepts on the other. Our main results are: 1) Marginal medians are DIC if and only if they are calculated with respect to coordinates defined by a basis such that the norm is orthant-monotonic in the associated coordinate system. 2) Equivalently, marginal medians are DIC if and only if they are computed with respect to a basis such that, for any vector in the basis, any linear combination of the other vectors is Birkhoff-James orthogonal to it. 3) We show how semi-inner products and normality provide an analytic method that can be used to find all DIC marginal medians. 4) As an application, we derive all DIC marginal medians for l_{p} spaces of any finite dimension, and show that they do not depend on p (unless p=2).

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.008
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.513
Threshold uncertainty score0.841

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0080.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0000.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.084
GPT teacher head0.417
Teacher spread0.333 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2019
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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