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Record W3122493427

Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem

2018· preprint· en· W3122493427 on OpenAlexafffund
Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2018
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Windsor
FundersSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
KeywordsScheduling (production processes)Shapley valueCooperative game theoryJob shop schedulingUnanimityStability (learning theory)Computer scienceProperty (philosophy)Mathematical optimizationGame theoryMathematical economicsScheduleMathematics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The job scheduling problem is a classic operational research problem in which agents have jobs to be executed by machines in given time slots, with each machine being able to process only one job at a time. We study this problem using cooperative game theory, focusing on how to divide the minimum cost (of executing all jobs) between the agents. First, we characterize the set of stable allocations, which all charge only users whose jobs are executed in peak-demand time periods. Second, using properties designed to avoid strategic mergers or splits of the jobs, we offer axiomatizations for two remarkable stable allocation rules. Third, observing that all stable rules fail Unanimity Lower Bound (ULB), a property requiring that everybody pay an equal share of the first machine (since it is needed by all), we study and axiomatize the Shapley value, which satisfies ULB. A compromise is then proposed between Stability and ULB.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.017
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.033

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.017
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0040.005
Open science0.0020.002
Research integrity0.0020.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.151
GPT teacher head0.423
Teacher spread0.273 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2018
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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Same venueRePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207