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Record W3122653716

Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design

2011· preprint· en· W3122653716 on OpenAlexaff
Gorkem Celik, Michael Peters

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2011
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsReciprocalOutcome (game theory)Mechanism (biology)Set (abstract data type)Complete informationMechanism designComputer scienceRepeated gameMathematical economicsNon-cooperative gameGame theoryMicroeconomicsEconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract. We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players’commitments. We characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in this reciprocal contracting game. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized design problem where a mechanism designer can o¤er contracts in which all players would voluntarily participate: Unlike this centralized design procedure, the reciprocal contracting game makes it possible for players to convey partial information about their types at the time they o¤er contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modeling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.017
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.633
Threshold uncertainty score0.886

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0170.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.321
GPT teacher head0.416
Teacher spread0.094 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2011
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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