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Record W3123045665

Note on Self-Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector

2009· article· en· W3123045665 on OpenAlexaffabout
Sati P. Bandyopadhyay, Jennifer L. Kao

Bibliographic record

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal · 2009
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicFinancial Reporting and Valuation Research
Canadian institutionsUniversity of AlbertaUniversity of Waterloo
Fundersnot available
KeywordsAuditOrdinary least squaresPublic sectorBusinessAccountingDominance (genetics)Private sectorBig FourExtant taxonEconomicsEconomyEconometrics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big-N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self-selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one-stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public-sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate.Results indicate that, after controlling for a self-selection bias, Big-6 (non-Big-6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non-Big-6 (Big-6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big-6 and non-Big-6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60-km radius, rather than over a province-wide audit market. The existence of non-Big-6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private- or public-sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non-Big-6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private-sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non-Big-6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self-selects to be audited by them.An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004), who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfill much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.377
Threshold uncertainty score0.509

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.299
Teacher spread0.277 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2009
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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