Do the Benefits of Reducing Accounting Complexity Persist in Markets Prone to Bubble?*
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Standard setters and regulators generally assume that making accounting easier to process leads to more efficient markets, thereby benefiting traders. I test that assumption in markets that are prone to price bubbles. Market efficiency will obtain only if reducing complexity in accounting leads traders to acquire and process that information more readily, and then to trade in a manner that moves price closer to fundamental value. This reasoning implies two causal links - (1) the link from less complex information to greater processing of that information, and (2) the link from greater processing of information to more efficient markets. I test these causal links in an experiment by examining the effect of reducing accounting complexity on market efficiency, as mediated by processing accounting information and as moderated by the market’s propensity to form price bubbles. Traders buy and sell shares of an asset in a multiperiod, double auction market in which speculative capital gains are possible. I find that reducing complexity in information increases processing. However, this processing increases market efficiency only in markets that are less prone to a price bubble. Conversely, in markets more prone to bubble some traders that process information trade according to value, while other informed traders utilize profitable non-value trading strategies that exacerbate price inefficiencies.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.017 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".