Bibliographic record
Abstract
Governments and tax administrators around the world rely on the premise that audits will deter tax evasion. This Article presents experimental evidence that this premise may be, at least in part, misguided. Counterintuitively, I find that audits presented as random may induce taxpayers to cheat more. Where audits were described as being conducted at random, participants increased their levels of evasion in the tax periods immediately following the audit. This effect, however, did not plague nonrandom audits. When a separate group of participants faced audits that were presented as being nonrandom—participants were told that detected evasion would “flag” a participant for one or more future audits—participants cheated less in the periods immediately following the audit. Overall, average compliance in the nonrandom audit condition systematically and significantly dominated average compliance in the random audit condition. By revealing, under experimental conditions, strong behavioral responses to the way tax audits are presented, this Article highlights the potential enforcement benefits of being more transparent with taxpayers about the nature of audit selection.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.017 | 0.053 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.010 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".