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Record W3124038879 · doi:10.1145/3355902

The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare

2019· article· en· W3124038879 on OpenAlexafffund
Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, Junxing Wang

Bibliographic record

VenueACM Transactions on Economics and Computation · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of CanadaUniversity of PatrasNational Science Foundation
KeywordsFair divisionMinimaxNash equilibriumEconomicsWelfareProduct (mathematics)Mathematical economicsProperty (philosophy)MicroeconomicsMathematics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide outstanding fairness guarantees when allocating divisible goods. And while it seems to lose its luster when applied to indivisible goods, we show that, in fact, the MNW solution is strikingly fair even in that setting. In particular, we prove that it selects allocations that are envy-free up to one good—a compelling notion that is quite elusive when coupled with economic efficiency. We also establish that the MNW solution provides a good approximation to another popular (yet possibly infeasible) fairness property, the maximin share guarantee, in theory and—even more so—in practice. While finding the MNW solution is computationally hard, we develop a nontrivial implementation and demonstrate that it scales well on real data. These results establish MNW as a compelling solution for allocating indivisible goods and underlie its deployment on a popular fair-division website.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.031
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.009
Threshold uncertainty score0.034

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.031
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0030.005
Open science0.0020.003
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0090.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.017
GPT teacher head0.206
Teacher spread0.189 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations287
Published2019
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationSame topicGame Theory and Voting SystemsFrench-language works237,207