Security in Xml-Based Financial Reporting Services on the Internet
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Many companies are attempting to leverage the power of financial information by creating corporate websites to provide such information to employees, investors, and financial analysts. Extensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) was developed to provide users with an efficient and effective means of preparing and exchanging financial information over the Internet. Extensible Assurance Reporting Language (XARL) was designed to enable assurance providers to report on the integrity of information distributed over the Internet and help users and companies place warranted reliance on such information.The XBRL and XARL services are Internet-based message exchange methods. The Internet is insecure in nature. Without good security, XBRL and XARL services will not reach their full potential. Today's security approaches consist of a combination of user IDs and passwords and point-to-point, transport-level security for data transmissions over the Internet such as SSL/TLS, S-HTTP, and VPN. Access control techniques based on user IDs and passwords can protect files or data from unauthorized access but cannot guarantee the integrity of the information. Transport-level, point-to-point security is not sufficient for securing information that travels between several intermediaries or for encrypting only selected portions of an information set. Thus, alternative security approaches are needed to compensate for these limitations.This paper addresses security in financial reporting services. First, it describes Web services and conceptualizes financial reporting services such as XBRL and XARL as Web Services. Next, it discusses security threats and limitations of current security technologies. Then, it identifies security requirements that should be considered to ensure reliable, trustworthy XBRL and XARL services. Finally, the paper explains several proposed security standards and proposes Web Services Security Architecture as a suitable security mechanism for financial reporting services.
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Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.005 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it