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Record W3124495656 · doi:10.1257/aer.104.10.3365

The Effect of Mergers in Search Markets: Evidence from the Canadian Mortgage Industry

2014· article· en· W3124495656 on OpenAlexaffabout
Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Jean‐François Houde

Bibliographic record

VenueAmerican Economic Review · 2014
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicConsumer Market Behavior and Pricing
Canadian institutionsCenter for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on OrganizationsHEC MontréalBank of Canada
FundersTD Bank
KeywordsPrice dispersionEconomicsConsolidation (business)Market powerNegotiationDispersion (optics)Competition (biology)Database transactionBargaining powerMonetary economicsMicroeconomicsFinancial economicsFinanceDatabase

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We examine the relationship between concentration and price dispersion using variation induced by a merger in the Canadian mortgage market. Since interest rates are determined through a search and negotiation process, consolidation weakens consumers' bargaining positions. We use reduced-form techniques to estimate the mergers' distributional impact, and show that competition benefits only consumers at the bottom and middle of the transaction price distribution, and that mergers reduce the dispersion of prices. We illustrate that these effects can be explained by the presence of search frictions, and that the average effect of mergers on rates underestimates the increase in market power. (JEL G21, G34, K21, L13, L41)

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.025
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.154
Threshold uncertainty score0.311

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.025
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.004
Science and technology studies0.0020.003
Scholarly communication0.0020.001
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.022
GPT teacher head0.274
Teacher spread0.253 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations131
Published2014
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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