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Record W3124985548

Best Buy Co., Inc

2008· article· en· W3124985548 on OpenAlex
Edward Hess

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

aboutThe title or abstract carries a Canadian signal from the geographic lexicon.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal · 2008
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Governance and Management
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsBest practiceBusinessRevenueStock (firearms)ChinaMarketingPatienceVolatility (finance)CommerceFinanceEconomicsManagementEngineering
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In 2007, Best Buy was the leading electronics retailer in the United States with more than 941 stores, revenue totaling $31 billion, and a market cap of $21 billion. In 2005, Best Buy had adopted a new business model, culture, and customer-segmentation template called Customer Centricity. This move created volatility in the price of Best Buy stock because of the higher-than-expected employee costs that went with this new way of doing business and the difficulty of executing the old and the new business models simultaneously while the new model was rolled out. Best Buy responded to Wall Street's short-term focus in a myriad of ways. It first asked for investor patience, and stressed the strong operating results achieved in Best Buy stores operating under the new model. But in June 2007, after the stock dropped again, the CEO knew he had to decide whether to open more Best Buy stores, increase the company's dividend, or increase the stock-repurchase program. Excerpt UVA-S-0142 Best Buy Co., Inc. Best Buy Co., Inc., (Best Buy) was the leading electronics retailer in the United States in 2007, with more than 941 stores, revenue totaling $ 31 billion, and a market cap of $ 21 billion. In the past five years, Best Buy had more than doubled the number of its stores, expanding into Canada and China and adding new customer segments with the acquisition of Geek Squad, Magnolia Hi-Fi, Pacific Sales Kitchen and Bath Centers, Inc., and its 75% interest in Jiangsu Five Star Appliance Co., Ltd., China's third-largest chain of electronics and appliance stores. In 2005, Best Buy adopted a new business model, culture, and customer-segmentation template called Customer Centricity. This move created volatility in the price of Best Buy stock because of the higher-than-expected employee costs that went with this new way of doing business and the difficulty of executing the old and the new business models simultaneously while the new model was rolled out. Approximately 74% of Best Buy stock was owned by institutions and 19% by insiders (Exhibit 1). Stock volatility was evidenced by the following swings: a 10% drop in November 2005, to a per-share price of $ 43; a rebound to around $ 55 per share in April 2006, and then back to $ 45 in June and July 2006, with another rebound to $ 55 in October and November 2006; and then back again to $ 45 in June 2007. Best Buy responded to Wall Street's short-term focus in a myriad of ways. It first asked for investor patience, and stressed the strong operating results achieved in Best Buy stores operating under the new model. But in June 2007, after the stock dropped again to $ 45, CEO Brad Anderson knew he had to decide whether to open more Best Buy stores, increase the company's dividend, or increase the stock-repurchase program. . . .

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.796
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.015
GPT teacher head0.210
Teacher spread0.195 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it