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Record W3125291466

Investment and Screening under Asymmetric Endogenous Information

2002· preprint· en· W3125291466 on OpenAlexaff
Patrick González

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2002
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversité Laval
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEconomic rentInvestment (military)Perfect informationMicroeconomicsComplete informationInformation asymmetryEconomicsPrincipal (computer security)Bayesian gameImperfectInvestment strategyBusinessComputer scienceRepeated gameGame theory
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This paper provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information (Bayesian) environment. An agent faces a hold-up situation while making a cost-reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal. To prevent the hold-up, the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract. The informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment. Because uncertainty is endogenous, the equilibrium contract depends only on tastes, technology and on the strategic opportunities of both players.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Other design · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.949
Threshold uncertainty score0.769

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.195
GPT teacher head0.385
Teacher spread0.190 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designOther design
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2002
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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