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Record W3125441245

An Ascending Double Auction

2003· preprint· en· W3125441245 on OpenAlexaff
Michael Peters, Sergei Severinov

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsDouble auctionMathematical economicsBayesian gameMechanism (biology)Sequential equilibriumInterdependenceEconomicsMicroeconomicsMechanism designThe InternetRational agentCommon value auctionComputer scienceGame theoryEquilibrium selectionRepeated gameNeoclassical economics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders continue bidding if and only if their true estimates of the ’value ’ of the object being traded exceed the current price. This equilibrium is ex post efficient and has a rational expectations property in the sense that along the equilibrium path traders appear to have made the best possible trades conditional on information revealed by the trading process. 1

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.003
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.882
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0030.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.270
GPT teacher head0.497
Teacher spread0.227 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2003
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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