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Record W3125832436

Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms

2011· preprint· en· W3125832436 on OpenAlexaff
Yves Sprumont

Bibliographic record

VenueRePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2011
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsClass (philosophy)Mechanism (biology)Mathematical economicsPareto efficiencyPareto optimalPareto principleMechanism designObject (grammar)Mathematical optimizationComputer scienceMathematicsMulti-objective optimizationArtificial intelligence
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A single object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Money transfers are possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually rational mechanisms which are Pareto-optimal in the class of feasible, strategy-proof, anonymous and envy-free \nmechanisms. These mechanisms form a one-parameter infinite family; the Vickrey mechanism is the only Groves mechanism in that family.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.035
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.049

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.035
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.003
Science and technology studies0.0020.004
Scholarly communication0.0060.012
Open science0.0050.005
Research integrity0.0040.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0150.002

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.119
GPT teacher head0.386
Teacher spread0.267 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2011
Admission routes1
Has abstractno

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Same venueRePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsSame topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207