Bibliographic record
Abstract
Discount rates are essential to applied finance, especially in setting prices for regulated utilities and valuing the liabilities of insurance companies and defined benefit pension plans. This paper reviews the basic building blocks for estimating discount rates. It also examines market risk premiums, as well as what constitutes a benchmark fair or required rate of return, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the U.S. Federal Reserve’s bond-buying program. Some of the results are disconcerting. In Canada, utilities and pension regulators responded to the crash in different ways. Utilities regulators haven’t passed on the full impact of low interest rates, so that consumers face higher prices than they should whereas pension regulators have done the opposite, and forced some contributors to pay more. In both cases this is opposite to the desired effect of monetary policy which is to stimulate aggregate demand. A comprehensive survey of global finance professionals carried out last year provides some clues as to where adjustments are needed. In the U.S., the average equity market required return was estimated at 8.0 per cent; Canada’s is 7.40 per cent, due to the lower market risk premium and the lower risk-free rate. This paper adds a wealth of historic and survey data to conclude that the ideal base long-term interest rate used in risk premium models should be 4.0 per cent, producing an overall expected market return of 9-10.0 per cent. The same data indicate that allowed returns to utilities are currently too high, while the use of current bond yields in solvency valuations of pension plans and life insurers is unhelpful unless there is a realistic expectation that the plans will soon be terminated.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.087 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.006 | 0.009 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.013 | 0.007 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".