MétaCan
Menu
← Back to cohort
Record W3126103549

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

2004· preprint· en· W3126103549 on OpenAlexaff
Dominique Demougin, Claude Fluet, Carsten Helm

Bibliographic record

VenueTUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt) · 2004
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicEconomic theories and models
Canadian institutionsUniversité du Québec à Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInequity aversionEconomicsWelfare economicsMicroeconomicsWage inequalityWageInequalityLabour economicsMathematics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We analyse a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals.For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not.Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract that, owing to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other agent resents.We show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labour productivity.More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage, and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in the firm's output function.JEL classification: D2, J3 Produit et salaires quand les agents ont de l'aversion pour l'ine´galite´.Les auteurs analysent un environnement de travail a`deux taˆches ou`les individus ne sont pas inquie´te´s par le risque mais ont une aversion pour l'ine´galite´.Pour l'agent employe´a`la taˆche 2, le niveau d'effort est ve´rifiable, alors que pour la taˆche 1, il ne l'est pas.En conse´quence, l'agent 1 rec¸oit un contrat d'incitation qui, compte tenu de sa contrainte de richesse, entraıˆne une rente qui donne lieu a`du ressentiment chez les autres agents.On montre qu'une plus grande aversion a`l'ine´galite´entraıˆne sans ambiguı¨te´une chute de la production totale et donc de la productivite´moyenne du travail.Plus spe´cifiquement, l'aversion a`l'ine´galite´re´duit l'effort, le salaire et les gains de l'agent 1. L'effet sur le salaire et l'effort de l'agent 2 de´pend de la nature de la relation entre les niveaux d'effort dans les deux taˆches (substituts ou comple´ments) dans la fonction de production de l'entreprise.We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.Fluet is also affiliated with CIRANO.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.008
Threshold uncertainty score0.023

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.001
Scholarly communication0.0030.001
Open science0.0000.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.046
GPT teacher head0.206
Teacher spread0.160 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2004
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueTUbilio (Technical University of Darmstadt)→Same topicEconomic theories and models→French-language works237,207→