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Record W3134942440 · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.03.001

Central bank transparency, exchange rates, and demand imbalances

2021· article· en· W3134942440 on OpenAlex
Giacomo Candian

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.
fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Monetary Economics · 2021
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicMonetary Policy and Economic Impact
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
FundersFonds de Recherche du Québec-Société et Culture
KeywordsTransparency (behavior)EconomicsWelfareMonetary economicsVolatility (finance)Financial marketExchange rateInformation asymmetryPrice elasticity of demandPublic financeMicroeconomicsFinancial economicsMacroeconomicsFinanceMarket economy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Do the benefits of central bank transparency depend on the structure of financial markets? We address this question in a two-country model with dispersed information among price-setting firms. The volatility of the real exchange rate is non-monotonic in the precision of public communications. Despite this non-monotonicity, under complete markets, greater provision of public information always improves welfare and full transparency is optimal. By contrast, under incomplete markets, more accurate public signals can decrease welfare by exacerbating the cost of cross-country demand imbalances. If the trade elasticity is low, optimal public announcements are intentionally imprecise.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.274
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.051
GPT teacher head0.216
Teacher spread0.165 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it