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Record W3135779693 · doi:10.1093/wber/lhae011

Group Incentives for the Public Good: A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment

2024· article· en· W3135779693 on OpenAlex
Carol Newman, Tara Mitchell, Marcus Holmlund, Chloe Monica Fernandez

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenueThe World Bank Economic Review · 2024
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicFiscal Policy and Economic Growth
Canadian institutionsTrinity College
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIncentivePublic goodIntervention (counseling)BusinessRandomized experimentPublic economicsEconomicsPsychologyMicroeconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract What strategies can help communities to overcome the public goods problem in the maintenance of communal spaces and infrastructure in urban environments? This paper investigates whether an intervention targeted at Community-Based Organizations can motivate them to make increased contributions to the public good, thereby improving outcomes for the community as a whole. Using a randomized controlled trial conducted in Dakar, Senegal, the analysis tests the effectiveness of a program that provides incentives to community groups to encourage them to keep their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding. After one year, the intervention proved to be effective in engaging communities, improving cleanliness, and reducing flooding.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.939
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.003

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.040
GPT teacher head0.248
Teacher spread0.208 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it